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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-553
The National League of Cities
et al., Appellants,

v.

Application for Stay.

Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor.
[December 31 , 1974]
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER, Circuit Justice.
This matter came to me as an individual Circuit
Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit after the
close of regular business hour of this Court on Tuesday,
December 31, 1974, on a motion of the above-named
appellants. States. and municipalities, The National
League of Cities and the National Governors' Conference.
The application of said parties requests a stay of those
parts of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29
U. S. C. § 201 et seq., which go into effect January 1,
1975, to stay Regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor. 29 CFR Part 553-Employees of Public Agencies Engaged in Fire Protection or Law Enforcement
Activities. including security personnel in correctional
institutions of said States and municipalities, and for an
injunction against enforcement by the Secretary of Labor
or by any other person in any federal court to enforce
parts of the said 1974 Amendments to the abovedescribed Act, which went into effect May 1, 1974.
The above-entitled case was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia on December 12, 1974. A three-judge District Court was convened and on Monday, December 30, 1974, heard arguments on Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenors' ( all of who,
except for Plaintiff Intervenor State of California, are

-

-

-
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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. BRENNAN

Appellants on this Application) Application for a Preliminary Injunction. Earlier today an order was entered
dated December 31, 1974, denying a Preliminary Injunction and dismissing the Complaint in the above-entitled
action.
The three-judge District Court in denying the relief
on the day after it heard arguments expressed the view
that the Complaint raised "a difficult and substantial
question of law" but concluded that it was bound by
this Court's holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, 39·2 U. S. 183
(1968).
In light of the pervasive impact of the judgment of the
District Court on every state and municipal government
in the United States, the novelty of the legal questions
presented, the expressed concern of the District Court
as to the substantiality of the constitutional questions
raised, the brevity of time available to the District Court
and to me as Circuit Justice. and the extent and nature of
the injury to the applicants, it is not appropriate to take
final action as an individual Justice.
Against this background, and balancing the injury to
the contemplated enforcement of the regulations by the
Secretary, against the injury to the applicants if they
are ultimately successful, and sharing the doubts and
concerns articulated by the District Court. I am not prepared-less than fi ve hours before the Regulations of the
Secretary become effective-to do more than enter an
interim order granting the relief prayed for until the
application can be pr~sented to the full Court at the
earliest convenient elate. At that time the entire matter
can be considered with the benefit of a response from
the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary.
Accordingly, an order will be entered forthwith, granting the relief prayed until fµrther order of the Court
and referring the application to the full Court.
The Solicitor General has been directed to file any
response he desires to make on or before Wednesday',
January 8, 1975.
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January 10, 1975 Conference
Supplemental List
No. A-566
CALIFORNIA

v.

Application for Stay
Presented to the Chief Justice
and by Him Referred to the Court
Also, Motion to Expedite

BRENNAN, Sec 1 y of Labor
See memorandum in The National League of Cities v. Brennan, A-553, same
list.
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January 10, 1975 Conference
Supplemental List
No. A-553
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Motion to Intervene

NATIONAL LEAGUE
OF CITIES

v.
BRENNAN, Sec 2 y of Labor
IMMEDIATE SITUATION:

The AFL-CIO, the International Association of

Fire Fighters, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
the International Union of Operating Engineers, the Service Employees International
Union, the American Federation of Teachers, and the National Education Association
move for leave to intervene in the instant case and to file a brief in opposition to
petrs 2 application for stay.
CONTENTIONS: Intervention:

The unions contend that their membership com-

prises a large portion of state and municipal workers affected by the 1974 Amend-

· 7:1ents~ to the FLSA.
unprecedented.

-

A-

note that intervention at thi . .ge is unusual, but not

Banks v. Chic ago Grain Trimmers, 389 U.S. 913; NLRB v. Acme

Industrial Co., 384 U.S. 825 .

They u rge that the broad injunction sought by petrs

deprives all public employee s of their right to sue under § l 6(b) of the Act and note
that petr State s and Cities di d not seek this relief below.

They argue that to enjoin

these employees from exerci s ing this right without giving them an opportunity to
be heard raise questions o f due process.

They also note that had such relief been

sought below, they could have intervened pursuant to Rule 24 of the Fed. R. Civ. P.
and a r gue the rule here by a nalogy.
The unions als o urg e that the interests of their members will not be adequately
represented by res p Sec'y.

They note that the FLSA protects 2 overlapping interests--

that of the individual emplo yee i n adequate pay etc. and that of the public in industrial
peace etc. and feel that t hey mor e a dequately represent the interests of the employees.
t::"'· '

•

The unions specifically cite the

11

only indirect concern 11 that the Sec 1 y has in defending

the employ e es1 right to sue a state in federal court against an Eleventh Amend. claim.
They also t ake issue with several statements made by petrs in their proposed

J. S. - - ~ "The affected employees . • • are more concerned with maintaining their
status ~and not jeopardizing or losing their jobs through the increased costs
imposed by the A ct. "--and have attached an affidavit in response.
APFLICATION:

The unions oppose granting any interim relief to petrs.

On

the merits, t heir argument follows that of the SG.
On the equities, the unions note the extensive coverage of the 1974 Amendments,
including the i ncreased minimum wage applicable to those employees found constitu-

-'.!-.
' •'(°.:...

tionally covered in Wirtz.

The unions also note the lateness with which petr s seek

this relief and depreciate their argument that they were misled, urging that petr s
have been bearing most of the costs since May 1, 1974 and that the National A

'1 -

~i~ti ~ ns participat e d avely in the legislative procese As · does the SG., the
unions also a dvise that the departmental "regulations II complained of by petr s are

-

merely interpr etative guidelines.

With respect to a specific injunction against

employe e s e n fo rcing the rights accorded them under amended §16(b) of the Act., the
unions a r gu e that petrs have an adequate remedy at law, since they can assert the
11th Ame n d . and that equitable relief at this time is not warranted.
F i nally., the unions contend that in light of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 6 51.,
t h ere is a possibility that an injunction might permanently deprive employees of the
ri ght t o obtain back wages in the event petr s do not prevail on the merits.

The unions

urge that i f re lief is granted, such relief should be framed to avoid this result.,
p o s sib ly through an escrow arrangement.
There is no response.
Ginty
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Application for Stay Presented
to the Chief Justice and by Him ~ ~
Referred to the Court.
~ 4.- ~
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v.
BRENNA N, Sec'y of Labor

A-566
CALIFOR NIA

v.

Application for Stay Presented
to the Chief Justice and by Him
Referred to the Court.
Also, Motion for Expedited Appeal

BR ENNAN, Sec'y of Labor
IMME DIATE SITUATION:

-

Petrs, 19 states, three cities and the National League

of Cities, seek to enjoin/ stay enforcement of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor
S tandards Act and related departmental regulations which extend minimum wage,
overtime pay etc. coverage under the Act to certain state and local government

-

-

t:,

-

employees , including police and firemen .

-

The Chief J.ice granted interim relief,

granting the relief pra yed for pending r eferral of the application to the full Court.
See attached Chambers Opinion.
F ACT S:

Petrs brought suit on December 12, 1974, in USDC (D. C.) to enjoin, as

unc onstitutional, the enforcement of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (P. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amendi ng 29 U.S. C. 201 e t ~ • ) insofar as those
amendments would exte nd to an additional 3. 4 million state and local government
employee s ( sanitation workers, policemen, firemen, recreation employees, libraria ns
etc.) FLSA requirements respecting., i nter alia, ( 1) a minimum wage, (2) record
keeping, (3) time and a half pay for all time worked over 40 hours, (4) a prohibition
against the employment of hazardous child labor, ( 5) a prohibition against sex-based
wage di fferential s and ( 6) a prohibition against age discrimination.

The amendments

generally went into effe ct on May 1, 1974, except for the provisions relating to over-

time pay of police and firemen which was to become effective January 1, 1975.
On Decembe r 31, 1975., a 3-J USDC (D. C.) (Leventhal, Gasch, Parker; E:....£!)
denied petr s 1 m otion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint, finding
that although p etrs r aised" a difficult and substantial question of law,

11

the case was

.controlled by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), in which this Court upheld
the constitutionality of an earlier extension of the FLSA to employees of stateoperated schools and hospitals.

Citing the rationale of the Court in Wirtz that state

hospitals and schools were significant purchasers of out-of-state goods and that strikes
and work stoppages involving their employees would consequently interrupt and burden
the flow of goods across state lines, the USDC noted that it is uncontested that the
state and municipal institutions whose employees are reached by the 1974 Amendments
-

make substantial purchases in interstate commerce.

In substantial dicta, however,

the USDC noted that these institutions perform governmental functions, not seriously

-

- 3 -

-

in c ompe ti tion with private industry; expressed concern over the extensiveness

-

o f the a mendments and the enormous fiscal burden they impose on the states; and
sugge sted t hat the Court may feel it appropriate to draw back from the far -reaching
implications of Wirtz.
The USDC denied interim relief pending appeal here partially on the ground that
the only assistance available from such relief would be that states failing to comply
wi th the new provisions would not be exposed to the liquidated damages and double
damage penalties provided for bad faith violations of the Act.

The USDC felt that

si nce its opinion recognizes that petrs have raised a substantial constitutional quesHo n, this will be sufficient to indicate that the claim of the part of the cities and
s t ates that the Act cannot be constitutionally enforced has been raised in good faith.
I n their present application, petr s, pending appeal here., seek a stay of the 19 74

·e

.Amendments scheduled to go into effect January l; a stay of the related departmental
re gulations promulgated December 20, 39 Fed. Reg. 44142; an injunction against

any enfo.rcement by resp of those parts of the 1974 Amendments which went into
effect May 1; and an injunction of any action by any person other than resp, in any
Fe deral Court., to enforce those parts of the 1974 Amendments which went into effect
May 1.
CONTENTIONS:

(1)

Petrs, arguing concepts of federalism, contend that the

Fe deral Government has gone too far, that the state and local government employees
involved are engaged in sovereign governmental functions of the states and their
subdivisions, and that they are not engaged in commerce.

California picks up on

t he observation of the USDC that the instant case, unlike Wirtz, involves fire,

-

polic e, and other "governmental" personnel 1 not seriously in competition with private
e nte rprise 1 and notes this Court's stated responsibility to review Congress' exercise
of the Commerce Clause.

Wi;rtz, 392 U.S. at 190.

Petr s note the pendency of

..

-

- 4

-

Fry, Iowa v. Brennan, No. 73-1565 (being held for

-

J

and Coon v. California,

520 P. 1003 (1974), which petrs state is on its way to the Court.
On the equity side, petrs concede that they are somewhat late in seeking relief
but urge that they were mislead by the legislative history of the amendments which
indicated that the fiscal impact on the Cities and States would be small, but that in
preparation of their 197 5 budgets the magnitude of the Act's costs became clear for
the fir st time.

--

Petr s estimate that the additional costs for firemen alone in 197 5

----------

will be $200,000,000 and possibly one billion dollars for all state and local government
employees.

__...-,

Petr s also contend that the application of industry oriented regulations to cities

is creating mass confusion and that the police and firemen overtime regulations
issued December 20 could not possibly be implemented in the short time remaining

-

before the January 1 effective date.
Petrs urge that the importance of the issues involved and the enormous impact
that the -Amendments would have upon them require that the status quo be maintained
pendente lite and that an expedited briefing schedule is warranted.
(2) On the merits, the SG relies on Wirtz and argues that the employees to be
covered by the 1974 Amendments are basically of the same type as the 2. 9 million
held to be validly covered in Wirtz, i.e. nonsupervisory civil service employees who
are neither elected nor appointed.

Nor, the SG contends, can Wirtz be distinguished

on the ground that the activities covered by the new Amendments are more "governmental" than the school, hospital and transit activities involved in Wirtz--States and
local governments can no more discontinue their schools and mental hospitals than

-

• they can their police and fire protection services.
On the equities, the SG contends that a restraint on enforcement of the Amendments pending appeal would do nothing to protect petrs.

If the Amendments are

.
•

' .

-

J

-

· ultimately upheld by the Court, petrs >sta tutory obligat.s for back pay will reach

\-

back to the effe ctive dates of the provisions.

On the other hand, if petrs 1 position

is su stained, the denial of the rest r aints sought here will not have resulted in any
rrharm" because pending the determinati on of the constitutionality issue, they would
not be compelled to make t he payments required by the Act.
criminal penalties are pr ovi ded only for "wilful violations,

11

The SG notes that
that liquidated damages

are n ot author ized where the employer has "acted in good faith 11 and that the Secretar y
will not seek to invoke these provisions.
The SG also notes that the broad relief sought by petrs would enjoin the new minimum wage rates for employees covered by the Amendments upheld in Wirtz, the age
discrimination prohibitions etc. and that the departmental guidelines published on

.

_

December 20 do not impose any requirements in addition to those imposed by the
statute and thems elve s have no "effective date.
DISCUSSION:
the 3-J USDC.

11

The SG1 s argument on the irreparable injury issue tracks that of

Petr s fail to respond to it effectively, but it would appear unseemly

to have our Sta tes and Cities in noncompliance.

If a stay is granted, the Court may wish to fashion its relief more narrowly
than that prayed for by petrs.
There is a respon se.
There is a motion for expedited review.

Petrs, in each application, have filed

advanced copies of their J. S.

1/9/75
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A- 553
The Xational League of Cities
et al., AppeJlants,

v.

Application for Stay.

Peter J. Brennan , Secretary of Labor.
[DecC'mber 31, 1974]
MR. CHIEF Jl' STICE BURGER, Circuit Justice.
This matter came to me as an individual Circuit
Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit after the
close of regular business hour of this Court on Tuesday,
December 31. 1974, on a motion of the above-named
appellants, States. and municipalities, The National
League of Cities and the National Governors' Conference.
The application of said parties requests a stay of those
parts of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 93- 259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29
U. S. C. ~ 201 et seq., which go into effect January 1,
1975, to stay Regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor, 29 CFR Part 553-Employees of Public Agencies Engaged in Fire Protection or Law Enforcement
Activities. includillg security personnel in correctional
institutions of said States and municipalities, and for an
injunction again st enforcement by the Secretary of Labor
or by any other person in any federal court to enforce
parts of the said 1974 Amendments to the abovedescribed Act, which went into effect l\fay 1, 1974.
The above-entitled case was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia on December 12, 1974. A three-judge District Court was convened and on !vlonday. December 30, 1974, heard arguments on Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenors' (all of who,
except for Plaintiff Intervenor State of California, are

-

t:
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-

' ,

-

-
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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. BREKNAN

Appellants on this Application) Application for a Preliminary Injunction. Earlier today an order was entered
dated December 31 , 1974, denying a Preliminary Injunction and dismissing the Complaint in the above-entitled
action.
The three-judge District Court in denying the relief
on the day after it heard arguments expressed the view
that the Complaint raised "a difficult and substantial
que~.tion of law" but concluded that it was bound by
this Court's holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183
(1968).
In light of the pervasive impact of the judgment of the
District Court on every state and municipal government
in the United States, the novelty of the legal questions
presented, the expressed concern of the District Court
as to the substantiality of the constitutional questions
raised, the brevity of time available to the District Court
and to me as Circuit Justice. and the extent and nature of
the injury to the applicants, it is not appropriate to take
final action as an individual Justice.
Against this background, and balancing the injury to
the contemplated enforcement of the regulations by the
Secretary, against the injury to the applicants if they
are ultimately successful. and sharing the doubts and
concerns articulated by the District Court. I am not prepared-less than fi\'e hours before the Regulations of the
Secretary become effective-to do more than enter an
interim order granting the relief prayed for until the
application can be presented to the full Court at the
('arliest convenient date. At that time the entire matter
can be considered with the benefit of a response from
the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary.
Accordingly, an order will be entered forthwith, granting the relief prayed until further order of the Court
and referring the application to the full Court.
The Solicitor General has been directed to file any
response he desires to make on or before Wednesday',
,January 8, 1975.
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CALIFORNIA

v.
BRENNAN, Sec 1 y of Labor
1.

Appellants, 19 states, three cities, the National League of Cities and the

National Governors 1 Conference, challenge the constitutionality of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which extend minimuin wage, overtim.e pay
-

etc. coverage to certain state and local government employees, including police and
firemen.

The 3-J USDC dismissed app e llants 1 complaint for declaratory and injunc -

tive relief, holding _that th e case was controlled by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.

FACTS:

The FLS-as originall:· enacted in 1938,-quired employers covered

by the Act to pay those of their employees who were engaged in com1nerce or in the
-

p roduction of goods for commerce a minimum wage, as well as one and one - half times

v-.1re.

their regular ~ of pay for hours worked in exc 1.: s s of 40 a week; to keep records
necessary for the enforcement of the Act; and to comply with certain child labor
s tandards.

The States and their political subdivisions were specifically excluded fron,

t he Act 1 s coverage.
I n 1961, Congress extended the coverage of the Act, beyond employees themselves
e ngaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce , to all employees
o f certain

11

enterprises 11 which had some employees so engaged.

The States and local

g o vernments remained among the employers specifically excluded from FLSA coverage.
In 1 966, Congress extended the Act 1 s coverage to 2 . 9 million employees of State

----

I

~

a nd other public enterprises engaged in operating-transit compani\es;> hospitals , schools .
-

and related institutions.

Except to this extent

11

any State or political subdivision of a

State 11 was excluded from the Act 1 s definition of an

11

Employer .

11

The constitutionality

o f this extension of FLSA 1 s provisions to the States and local governments was upheld
in Wirtz.
In 1 974, Congress amended the Act to cover an additional 3 . 3 million (appellants
s ay

11

al1 11 ) nonsupervisory state and local government employees .

This extension of

"Z.

co verage was accomplished by removing the exclusionary language from the Act's
d efinition of

11

Employer 11 and by adding to it the phrase "public agency 11 (Nat 1 1

L eague of Cities J. S. App . 4b).

npublic agency" in turn was defined to include

government of a State or political subdivision thereof 11 (J. S. App. Sb) .

11

the

The definition

o f an "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com1nerce 11
-

was amended to include

11

an activity of a public agency 11 and to provide that:

The employees of an enterprise which is a public
agency shall for the purposes of this subsection
be deemed to be e1nployees engaged in commerce ,

(-

or employa handling, selling, or otherwi-working
on goods or materials that have been moved in or
produced for commerce. (J. S. App. Sb).
The amendment of the definition of

11

Employer 11 also has the affect
of allowing public
.,

employees to bring suit in federal court pursuant to §16(b) of the Act against States
and local governn1ents to recover minimum wages or overtime compensation unlaw__,

fully withheld.
The amendments generally went into effect on May 1, 1974, except for the provisions relating to overtime pay for police and firemen which were to become effective
January 1, 1975.
In Dec

ber, appellants sued in USDC (D. C.) to enjoin enforcement of the 1974

Amendments insofar as they apply to States and local governments.

They contended

that the FLSA amendments violated the 5th, 10th and 11th Amendments.

The 3-J

-

USDC denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed appellants 1 complaint, holding
__

that although appellants raised
was controll ed by Wirtz.

11

a difficult and substantial question of law,

11

the case

Citing the finding of the Co'.lrt in Wirtz that there was a

sufficient rational relationship of the 1966 Amendments to interstate commerce in
that state hospitals and schools were significant purchasers of out-of- state goods
and that strikes and work stoppages involving their employees would ~ns.eqneot:ly
interrupt and burden the flow of goods across state lines, the USDC noted that it 1s
uncontested here that the state and mu::ii'cipal institutions whose employees are
reached by the 1974 Amendments make substantial purchases in interstate commerce.
In substantial dicta, however, the USDC, noting other language of the Court in Wirtz,
392 U.S. at 197, commented that the institutions in issue here perform governmental
functions, not seriously iI_Lco1npetition with private industry.

The USDC also expresse d

....

-

concern over the extensive reach of the 1974 Amendments and the fiscal burden they
impose and suggested that the Court may feel it appropriate
far-rea ching implications of Wirtz.

11

11

to draw back from the

The Court granted.pellants a stay of the effectiv-ss of the 1974 Amendments,
1

conditioned on an expedited schedule for filing of their J. S. s.

,.e

CONTENTIONS:

(1) Appellants seek to limit Wirtz to its facts and distinguish

it from the present case.
and the

11

They argue that reliance on the

11

labor strife 11 rationale

use of goods imported interstate 11 theory of Wirtz in not enough, but that

Wirtz also requires that the government enterprises in question must be found to be

n

in competition with private industry.

They note the finding in Wirtz that State schools

and hospitals are to some extent in competition with private schools and hospitals and
contend that it was this distinction which the USDC failed to recognize.

They empha-

size, of course, the Amendments 1 application to police and firemen and maintain that
these

11

e s sential Government functions 11 compete with no one.

Analogizing to the

11

rational basis 11 test employed in other Co::i.stitution contexts,

appellants contend that Federal legislation which interferes with rights and powers

te

protected by the 10th Amendment must also be scrutinized under the 5th Amend1nent
standard of rationality.

They contend that the Court did not have to consider such a

~

test in Wirtz because of its finding of no Federal interference with State and City
functions, and argue that in view of the broad reach of the Amendments here the
Court cannot escape such consideration.

They distinguish such cases as United

States v. California, 297 U.S. 175; California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577; and
Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, as involving "proprietary" functions and argue that
a State 1 s sovereign, non-competitive, unique functions such as those

V\

<?'i' ". \ \ ,, \,

~ ~

"'<

no

rational relationship to commerce so as to create a constitutional basis for their
regulation under the Commerce Clause
Appellant California emphasizes the importance of this case to the States in
--

terms of fiscal expenditures as well as State programs and argues that in V{irtz
the Court itself recognized the importance of judicial review of Congress 1 exercise
of the com1nerce power.

.

(2)

The SG argues-at there is no significant diffe-ces between this case

and Wirt z, that lhe several constitutional questions raised by appellants were
-

settled in Wirtz and that the judgment of the USDC should be affirmed.

The SG

argues that there is no significant difference between the activities reached in Wirtz
and those reached here, but even if there were , that the Court 1 s finding of a
basis 11 for congressional action in Wirtz relied on the

11

labor strife 11 and

11

11

rationa l

goods

imported" findings and is dispositive here.
The SG maint~ins that appellants argument of an unconstitutional "take -over 11
of state and local government budgets and personnel was rejected in Wirtz, as well
as in two previous cases, Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, and United
States v. California, 29 U.S. 175.

The SG also contends that appellants 1 attempts to

distinguish the instant case on the claim that "essential Government services 11 and

-

11

unique sovereign governmental functions 11 has no basis.

of Wirtz

11

He relies o::i the language

that the Federal Governm ent, when acting within a delegated power, may

override countervailing state interests whether these be de scribed as 1 governmental1
or 1 proprietary1 in character' 1 392 U.S. at 195.

The SG argues that the schools and

hospitals covered by the 1966 Amendments were as much

11

essential Government

\ services 11 as any of the public agencies covered by the 1974 Amendments.
There is a motion to affirm.
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Please refer to my attached Supplemental Memorandum for the January 10

-

Conference in National League of Cities v. Brennan, Sec'y of Labor.1 A-553.
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April 17, 1975

No. 74-878 National League of Cities
v. DunlOE,
MEMO FOR CONFERENCE
I summarize my present thinking, subject to Conference
discussion, as follows:
Re conciling two constitutional provisions or principles:
We must reconcile the federal government's connnerce
power with principles of federalism (described as the 10th

-

Amendment or more generally as federalism in a broder sense).
/ In my view, federalism is an independent constitutional
principle that can limit exercise of the commerce power
in the same way that provisions guaranteeing individual

I liberties do.

The problem is how best to acconnnodate the connnerce
clause and federalism when they collide.

I am aided here by

the concession of the Solicitor General that preservation of
the states as autonomous political units, and government's
functioning independently of the federal government is
essential.

Indeed, the structure of our Constitution, the

system of "sovereign states", and indeed our entire history
support the concept of federalism.

-

It is as central to our

form of government as the doctrine of separation of powers.

t

-

-

-

2.

One may deduce from the foregoing a presumption that the
burden is on the government to support the validity of
federal action which restricts or interferes with (as in this
case) the carrying out by the states of governmental functions.
But given such a presumption, it is still necessary to identify
a principled basis of analysis for drawing the line.
Balancing analysis
The Solicitor General suggested that this Court, on a
case-by-case basis, must balance the asserted federal interests
against the degree of interference with state interests.

-

The

SG apparently considers the level of permissible interference
to be a factual matter, with findings by Congress to be given
controlling weight so long as there is "a rational basis"
supporting them.
I think we could decide this case on a balancing analysis,
and conclude that here Congress has gone too far.

Although

the initial impact on the states may be only minimal in terms
of dollars or even record keeping, the federal interference
is nevertheless substantial.
The interference derives primarily from the inje-ction
of federal regulation of the very core of state government,
namely, the employer-employee relationship with respect to
governmental functions.

-

As noted in argument, state employees

may no longer look primarily to their employeers -but rather

-

-

-

3.

will view the federal government as the repository of ultimate
power over wages and working conditions.

If the Congress has

the power to prescribe minimum wages, it also has the power
to increase these from time to time, to include (and the SG
concedes) executive and administrative officers and employees,
and to apply the National Labor Relations Act to state
employees.

These are serious interferences with vital functions

and responsibilities of state sovereignty.
The primary interest invoked by the SG in his argument
is the need to prevent substandard wages.

This, in itself,

reflects the significance of the federal intrusion.

The mere

fact that Congress here in Washington determines that wages

-

are substandard does not mean that, in fact, they are
substandard in every state for all employees of state and
all local governments.

The judgment of the federal govern-

ment in Washington will have been substituted for that of the
states and localities.
The SG argues, of course, that because of substandard
wages there may be adverse effects in terms of labor unrest
and unfair competition.

These are legitimate arguments but,

as I would weigh them in the scales, they would not overbalance the degree of intrusion upon legitimate state
functions.

-

-

-

-

w

4.
j

he

The necessity rationale

I_

1'll

Another analytical approach would test the federal
legislation in tenns of its essentiality to the effectuation
of the federal program.

In this case, for example, the

question is whether subjecting all state employees to FLSA
standards is necessary or essential to the effectiveness of
national wage and hour regulation?

The short answer, perhaps,

is that more than a third of a century has passed since FLSA
was enacted in 1938, and only in 1974 did Congress undertake
to regulate state employees.

I know of no finding that this

regulation is necessary - at this late date - to effectuate

-

the basic objectives of the Act.
Or putting it differently, the national interests in
~promoting fair wages and hours in private industry is not
frustrated or handicapped by failing to include all state
employees.
A distinction may be properly drawn here between
employees of state activities that compete with private
enterprise, and state employees who do not so compete.
If t~e states are left out, they would have a competitive
advantage over private enterprise that might lead to a
misallocation of resources or to unfair competition.

Thus,

I could support Wirtz as to hospitals - although perhaps
not as to schools.

-

./jjtl'
I..
flltfl 1

vea (fO-'

o-fi"

.,

.

-

-

-

5.

The "necessity principle" also is compatible with the
result in Fry, where inclusion of state and local employees
was necessary to the effectuation of the national program.
It also is compatible with Sanitary District v. United States,
where the national interest in the water level and navigation
on the Great Lakes would have been adversely affected.
United States v. California was the authority which Justice
Harlan found to be controlling in Wirtz.

Its rationale was

that the operation by California of a railroad directly in
interstate commerce had an adverse effect on such cormnerce
as well as on fair competition with privately operated

-

railroads.

To prevent such competition, it was necessary

to regulate the state competitor.
In sum, whether I adopt the balancing approach suggested
by the SG or the "necessity principle" to effectuate legitimate
federal policy, I conclude that Congress has gone too far by
extending FLSA to all state and local governmental employees wholly without regard to their particular relationship to
interstate commerce, to any specific federal program, and
in the absence of competition with private interests.

L. F. P. , Jr.
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I summarize

my

present thinking, subject to Conference

discussion, as follows:

Reconciling two constitutional provisfons or principles:
· We must reconcile the federal government's commerce
power with principles of federalism (described as the 10th
Amendment or more generally as federalism in a broder sense).
In my view, federalism is an independent constitutional
principle that can limit exercise of the commerce power
in the same way that provisions guaranteeing individual
liberties do.
The problem is how best to accommodate the commerce
clause and federalism when they collide.

I am aided here by

the concession of the Solicitor General that preservation of
the states as autonomous political units, ~

overnment's

functioning independently of the federal government is
)

essential.

Indeed, the structure of our ~onstitution, the

system of "sovereign states", and indeed our entire history
support the concept of federalism.

It is as central to our

form of government as the doctrine of separation of powers.

.

.

-

•

2.

One may deduce
from the foregoing
a _..,rp~esumption that the
'
.
f

!

'~

",

_

,

f

11

burden is on the, government to support .·the :validity of
federal action which, restricts or interfere• with (as in this
case) the carrying out·· by the 's tates 'of governmental functions.

But given such a presumption, it is still necessary to identify
a principled basis of analysis for drawing the line.
Balancing analysis
'!be Solicitor General suggested that this Court, on a
case-by-case basis, must balance the asserted federal interests
against the degree of interference with state interests.

'!be

SG apparently considers the level of permissible interference
to be a factual matter, with findings by Congress to be given
controlling weight so long as there is "a rational basis"
supporting them.
I think we could decide this case on a balancing analysis,
and conclude that here Congress has gone too far.

Although

the initial impact on the states may be only minimal in terms
of dollars or even record keeping, the federal interference
is nevertheless ~ubstantial.
'!be interference derives
'

of federal regulation of the very core of state government,
namely, the employer-employee relationship with respect to
governmental functions.

As noted in argument, state employees

may no longer look primarily to their employetrs but rather

-

•

3.

will view the federal gove~ent as the repository,, of ultimate
r

power over wages and wo1:king cond(tions.
.

.

'

''·

..

'

If tlie Congress has

1

•.. r'

the power to prescribe minimum wages. it also has the power
tf:·,.

t

I

t

't

to increase these
. from', · time to
time;
~·
. ·to .include (and the SG
.

',-

.

concedes) executive anci adm~istrative
(?fficers
and employees.
.
.
'

'

and to apply the 'Nationai Labor Relati"ons Act to state
employees.

These are serious interferences with vital functions

and responsibiiities of state sovereignty.
The primary interest invoked by the SG in his argument
is the need to prevent substandard wag.es.

This• in itself,

reflects the significance of the federal intrusion.

The mere

fact that Congress here in Washington determines .that wages
'

are substandard does not mean that, in fact, they are
substandard in every state for a~l employees of state ~d
all local governments.

The judgment of the federal govern-

ment in Washington will have been substituted for that of the
state• and localities.
The SG argues, of course, that because of substandard
wages there may be adverse effects in terms of labor unrest

and unfair ·competition.

These are legitimate arguments but,

as 1 ·wo~ld weigh them in the scales, they would not overbalance the degree of intrusion upon legitimate state
functions.

.

---:-----~--~-~~~----~----

---:;.

•

•

4.

The necessity rationale
Another analytical approach would test the federal
legislation in terms of its essentiality to the effectuation
of the federal program.

In this case, for example, the

question is whether subjecting all state employees to FLSA
standards is necessary or essential to the effectiveness of
national wage and hour regulation?

The short answer, perhaps,

is that more than a third of a century has passed since FLSA
I

was enacted in 1938, and only in 1974 did Congress undertake
to regulate state employees.

I know of no finding ·,that this

regulation is necessary - at this late date - to effectuate
the basic -objectives of the Act.
Or putting it differently, the national interests in

promoting fair wages and hours in priva te industry is riot
frustrated or handicapped by failing to include all state

I,.._

employees.

A distinction f t ~ d r awnl.here between
employees of state activities that compete with private
enterpr:l.iur,: and· _s ta.te , ~ployees who do 1-1ot rs9 compete.
t,

'

1.. , ~: (·:::•.

J l,

• I

•

•

t ,. .

~

.· -

.,

.,.

If the states are left out, they would have a competitive
.. ,

.

I

advantage over _private enterprise,- t~t 1might lead to a
.

misallocation of resources or to ,unfair ,,competition.

Thus,

I could support Wirtz as to hospitals· - although perhaps
not as to schools.

~

-

~. ·/

•

•

~

s.

The "necessity principle" also is compatible with the
result in l.!:I,, where inclusion of state and local employees
was necessary to the effectuation of the. national ·program.
It also is compatible with Sanitary District v. United States,
where the national interest in the water level and navigation

on the Great Lakes ~ould have been adversely affected.
United States v. California was the authority which Justice
Harlan found to be controlling in Wirtz.

It• rationale was

that the operation by California of a railroad directly in
interstate commerce had an adverse effect on such comnerce
.

.

as well as on fair competition -with privately operated
railroads.

To prevent such competition, it was necessary

to regulate the state competitor.
In sum, whether I adopt the balancing approach suggested
by the SG or the ''necessity principle" to effectuate legitimate
federal policy, I conclude that Congress has gone too far by
extending FLSA to

ill. state and local governmental employees -

wholly without regard to their ·particular relationship to
interstate commerce, to any specific federal program, and
in the absence of competition with private interests.
L.F.P., Jr.
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BENCH MEMO

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Penny Clark

DATE:

April 17, 1975

No. 74-878 National League of Cities v. Dunlop
No. 74-879 California v. Dunlo£
I have arranged this memo in two parts:

(1) a discussion
"3 ct'Z..t.lS"

l8>

whether, without overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, you can hold
that the 1974 FLSA amendments, as applied to all state and
local government employees, lack a "rational basis" under
the commerce clause, and (2) an outline of a constitutional
doctrine that would use the principles of federalism to limit

-

regulation of state activities under the commerce power.

I.
Two theories have been used in the past to support the
FLSA under the commerce clause.

-

First is the "unfair com-

petition" theory, based on the fact that effective regulation

,.

of wages in an industry requires regulation of all who compete
in that industry.

If only some of the competitors are subject

to minimum wage laws, then other competitors will have a price
advantage.

This theory was strong support for action under
---......,
_,,,..,,,
~
the commerce clause in 1938, when some states had minimum
..,,

~-

....

wages and others did not, because the wage differential
effected a discrimination in interstate commerce against

-

industry in minimum-wage states.

It has less validity when

the discrimination is between private industry and governmental

-

-

•

2.

enterprise in a single state, but it may still furnish some
justification for regulatin g governmental activities that are
in competition with private enterprise.

The second theory

supporting the FLSA relies on the connection between substandard
working conditions and labor disputes.
Q

4bSC2 .,,-,

Because labor disputes,

r:bJ,

particularly strikes, can impede the flow of goods in interstate commerce, Congress can act to protect interstate commerce
by prohibiting substandard working conditions that may lead to
such labor disputes.

This is the theory on which the Court

relied in Wirtz to uphold minimum wages and overtime provisions
in state hospitals and schools.
(I will use the word "state"
to
to refer both/state and local government throughout this memo).

-

Because state hospitals and schools purchased a substantial
quantity of interstate goods, the Court reasoned that Congress
could have believed that labor disputes in schools and
hospitals would burden this flow of goods in commerce.

I had hoped that we could make an argument for
distinguishing Wirtz on the ground appellants have referred
1966
to as the "ultimate consumer" issue. Under the/amendments
I

'- \

l enter prises were not covered by the FLSA unless they had
employees that handled "goods" that either were destined for
interstate ' commerce or had already moved in interstate commerce.
The term "goods" was defined to exclude goods in the hands of

wt,;c_ate.
M&ti@

an wau

----

consumer.

Consequently, a hospital or school

--

was not covered under the 1966 amendments unless it somehow

-

.....,

.

sold interastate g___oods to its patients or students.
...,...

....

---...... ~:war--

'

Under

-

-

•

the 1974 amendments, this limitation

3.

b:J disappeared.

-

State

agencies are declared to be enterprises whose em£_loyees handle

------

......

-

:;_,

interstate goods, regardless of fact.
z.w;::

----=----

29 U.S.C.

§

203(s).

As I see it, labor strife among employees handling goods in
an interstate production or distribution chain would more
directly disrupt interstate commerce than labor strife among
employees whose employers merely purchase interstate goods
for consumption.

But for purpose of constitutional limits

on the commerce power - apart from the limits imposed by
fe deralism - I think it is a matter of degree rather than
substance, and I would be reluctant to hold that one is
constitutionally de minimis when the other is not.

-

In terms

of established "rational basis" analysis, I suppose Congress
could reasonably believe that long-term strikes in a consumer
enterprise could reduce the enterprise's purchases and thus
"burden commerce".
I therefore have withdrawn to a more traditional approach ~ .
i.,)~

-----

of examining the facts asserted as a "rational basis" for the
1974 amendments.

---·

The Solicitor General presents three

alternate "rational bases".
(1)

Labor striie theory.

In 1971 state expenditures

for goods and services (other than employees > wages) represented
5% of the gross national product.

Many· of these expenditures

represent purchases of interstate goods.

-

Labor disputes and

work stoppages in public agencies could decrease the purchase
of goods in interstate commerce.

In addition, strikes among

-

-

•

4.

some public employees, such as police, firemen and utility
workers, can disrupt interstate commerce and industry directly

by

depriving them of necessary services.
To the extent that many states do not allow their employees

to strike, the Solicitor General's argument could be challenged
on factual grounds.

The question for commerce clause analysis,

however, is whether the potential for strikes in those states
that allow them (and for other forms of work slowdowns in states
that don't) is sufficient to support a congressional decision
to regulate working conditions in all state agencies rather
than in just those that present the problem.
Another problem with the Solicitor General's analysis,

-

perhaps more fruitful for our purposes, is the breadth of
the regulation.

In Wirtz this Court sustained FLSA coverage

,,--..

of employees who did not themselves handle interstate goods
under the "enterprise theory".

According to the Court in

Wirtz, under the Act an enterprise was "a set of operations
whose activities in commerce would all be expected to be

-

affected by the wages and hours of any group of employees."
392 U.S. at 197 n. 27.

Congress could regulate the working

conditions of all employees within such an enterprise because
the wages of all would affect the price of the interstate goods
being produced or the employer's ability to make interstate
purchases, and because labor strife among any group of

-

employees could affect the rest of the

J~t*\~

operation.

Under the 1974 amendments, any public agency (including an

-

•

5.

entire state) is deemed an "enterprise" so that the Act covers
all employees, regar~ e ~
a~

-

-.........::

-------

of whether they personallz handle

•

--

interstate goods or whether their dissatisfaction would be
expected to affect other parts of the "enterprise" that do.
Because this factual premise is lacking, I find it much
harder to sustain the "labor strife" theory as a rational basis
for regulating the working conditions of all state employees,
unless we make the assumption that all state employees have
some contact with articles that have at some time traveled
in interstate commerce, and that the cont•act is of such a
character that work slowdowns would be expected to decrease
~ 1.,e_ A• 1 P1 h, ) ~
the purchases of such articles. .. ,.;_ ...
~~

-

~

-~, -- ,

A decision denying rational basis on these grounds would
lead to reversal only if there is no rational basis on the
other two grounds as well.

To some extent, such a decision

would affect the operation of the FLSA in the private sector
since the 1974 amendments also had the practical effect of
nullifying the "ultimate consumer" exception.

(Now the Act

covers enterprises that have employees handling "goods or
materials" that have moved in, or are destined for, interstate
commerce.

Although the definition of "goods" is still

restrictive, "materials" is not defined to exalude goods
purchased for consumption.

If this change is read to bring

. . . , under the FLSA employees who have conta ct with type-

-

writers or motor vehicles that have moved in interstate
commerce, it almost conclusively destroys the validity 1111

-

•

•
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of the "labor strife" theory as a support for the Act.

,j'AY>'

I

think it rather unlikely that an employer's capital expenditures
t\

would be diminished significantly by labor disputes with his

:/)y
employees : )
(2)

Unfair competition theory.

The Solicitor General

confesses that only some agencies compete with private
enter prise.

-

Thus, I have no difficulty in saying that the

unfair competition theory is inadequate to support an extension
~

...~-------

-

a.www.a ,,,,_,,

....

---

of the FLSA to all state agencies.
-

~

........

,,,_,z.wu;:

•

-

~

---

To avoid this problem,

.,.,...,,-,-.

the Solicitor General suggests that states and local governments compete among themselves for the location of industry,
and that the commerce clause gives Congress power to prohibit

-

such competition on the basis of low taxes grounded on
substandard working conditions.

This is a novel constitutional

theory, and I do not find it persuasive.

An amicus brief

raises another theory of unfair competition:

states frequently

subcontract services to private enterprise; if they can pay
low wages to their employees, they will subcontract less;
therefore, low wages have an impact on private enterprise.
lo:i ln-.t ~ 1'.0t 1'!.L'uJ h ~ c(),A~res.s)
I tend to think this argument~does not provi e tH necessary
link to interstate corrnnerce.

Most subcontracting would

involve services, local in nature, and whether the work is
subcontracted or performed by the state's employees would
not seem to affect the volume of interstate goods purchased

-

or used.

-

(3)

A new theory:

e
7.
"economic health."

The Solicitor

General argues that the commerce clause empowers Congress to
regulate the national economy and therefore enables it to take
measures to eliminate substandard wages, decrease joblessness,
and stimulate (or discourage) consumer spending, all in the
name of economic health.

Although this is new as a constitutional

t heo ry offered in support of the FLSA, it is probably the most
honest reflection of the true purpose behind the 1974 amendments.
Analytically, it seems an almost unimpeachable interpretation
of the commerce power.

The argument has two premises:

(1)

the state of the economy has a substantial impact on "commerce"
e ven if that term is defined narrowly, to mean only the flow

-

of goods;

(2) the economy must be monitored to keep it

healthy and to avoid burdens on "commerce," and only the
federal government can perform this function effectively.
Despite the soundness of the theory in general, I have
) s~me questions about the factual premise for its application
here.

The Solicitor General says that the theory supports

the 1974 FLSA amendments because they have the effect of
spreading jobs, reducing unemployment, and stimulating consumer
s pending.

The overtim~ provisions of the FLSA~

effect of spreading jobs and reducing unemployment:

ave the

7

instead

of regularly paying premium wages for overtime work, employers
are likely to hire more employees.

-

The minimum wage provisions,

however, tend to have the opposite effect:

when an employer

-

-

•

8.

has to pay his employees more for their basic work week, he

-

-

is likely to increase productivity and lay off some workers.
This is especially true when the employer cannot readily

~

raise his prices and pass the increased cost on to his customers.
The posited effect of stimulating consumer spending is also
questionable, when the employees' increased salaries must come
from taxes.

Depending on the state's tax structure, the

increased salaries may simply come out of the pockets of other
consumers who would be buying the same goods that state
employees will buy with their raises.
In deciding whether these objections are sufficient to
deprive the "economic health theory" of "rational basis"

-

status under the commerce clause, it is necessary to keep
in mind the Court's role.

It is not inconsistent with "rational

basis" review to question the factual grounds presented in
support of the legis l ation, but the ultimate question is not
whether the Court believes the regulated practice has an
effect on interestate corrnnerce, but whether Congress rationally

~

could have believed that it did.

This s uggests that overturning

the amendments on rational basis grounds would require a rather
strong refutation of the facts asserted in support of the
argument that working conditions of state employees, as a
class, affect commerce.

The Court can properly take into

account the number of state employees who would be affected

-

immediately by the 1974 amendments.

Out of 11.4 million

state employees (as of 1973), only 95,000 of those who were

-

-

-
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not already covered by the FLSA were earning less than the
minimum wage in 1974.

The Government estimates that at most

10% of the newly covered employees were working longer hours
than the overtime provisions of the Act allow.

The first

category can be viewed as de minimis but if more than a
million employees are affected by the overtime provisions,
it would be hard to reach the same conclusion on that part
of the Act.
My net impression is that we might be able to write an

------

opinion upholding Wirtz but finding too little impact on
......-

__...__

~

commerce to sustain the 1974 amendments as they apply to
state employees.

It would be difficult, however, and it might

represent a cutback from the Court's recent expansive inter-

~
~

pretation of the commerce clause.

We would have to conclude

that all three theories fail the "rational basis" analysis.
The ruling would not clarify the state-federal issues for the
future.

(

For these reasons, I would be inclined to rely on the

----- ---

principles of federalism to limit the exercise of the commerce
power in direct regulation of state activities.
II.
The theory I would employ is quite simple.

The "rational

basis" standard for testing congressional power under the
conunerce clause

-refit.ct"~

the Court's perception

of its role in implementing the limits on congressional power

-

under the commerce clause.

Although the Court may yet strike

•

-

-
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down legislation that has no relation to the protection of
cormnerce, it has wisely refused to debate with Congress over
the wisdom, appropriateness, or efficacy of particular programs,
as long as they can be rationally justified in relation to
c ormnercial intercourse among the states.

l

-

The Court undertakes

active review of federal legislation under the commerce clause

only when it collides with other provisions of the Constitution.

This practice suggests that the Court does not perceive the
limitation implicit in the enumeration of congressional powers

as a substantial protection for private citizens:

citizens

are not entitled to be free of congressional action unless
Congress clearly oversteps the limits.

-

Doubts are resolved

in favor of Congress.

\\

; ~r>ll"J: g

The Court has a greater role to play i n O

) federal

system.

the

It quite clearly sits to protect the national

government from state interference; no other federal body is
equipped to serve this function.

The political restraints on

Congress make the Court's function as a protector of the states

....
~-~-----------'--~-

less crucial, but the Court still should take a more active

~

-

__,..:was

••

-

role in behalf
of the states than it takes in behalf of citizens.
....,..,_,,
Moreover, the principles of federalism (whether - described
in

-

shorthand terms as the Tenth Amendment or simply called

....

federalism) operate as an independent constitutional principle
~
,,., ~
that can limit exercise of the commerce power in the same

-

L

~

-

-

way that provisions guaranteeing individual liberties do. *
The difficulty of the case is deciding how best to
accommodate the two conflicting principles: (1)

the national

interest in centralized authority over matters affecting the
national economy or the tangible flow of goods between states,
and (2) the necessity of preserving the states as autonomous
political units and functioning governments.

✓

11.

With the aid

---

of Ron, Joel and the Solicitor General, I have identified
two modes of analysis for reconciling these interests.
(1)

The necessity principle.

Congress may include states

in a general regulatory program when necess a ry for the program's
effectiveness.

-

To put it another way, Congress may regulate

state activities when the national interest requires it.

This

rule would preserve federal power to take effective action in
the national interest, but it would also establish that the
u.~~e.cus~~
states are entitled to be free of ~• • • interference in the
forms and methods by which they carry out governmental functions. ~~
I would have no difficulty, on the facts suggested in
this case (although perhaps it should be remanded for further
factual development), concluding that the national interest

---------------

--

does not require inclusion of all state employees under the
* I do not suggest that the following analysis should apply to

other enumerated congressional powers. The war power, for
example, may justify much more interference with state functions,
on the ground that during war the national interest is overwhelming, and the states cannot be allowed to interfere.

-

-· n..«:s pri~le, is

Co-u.,js

~trllY"~ h ~~eJ&.'a( .sta1i~n i~ 4k
,t't."iou.~ t.b#W\41\t..t. clw.M- c.asu) b~ it ~Nls. sow.e ~ a l
.$~p~+ i II\. tascMg c.aga.s . Thi" "'1'&-u.lcl c,lc~~ l?e.. -ne.w- laur .

-

FLSA.

-

12.

(The reasons generally track my discussion in Part I,

and I will not repeat it here).

The effectiveness of the

FLSA program as a whole, however, may require inclusion of

=
=
activities that
--,

those state

Ct:f

compete with private enterprise.

If the states are left out, they would have a competitive
' -

advantage over private industry that might lead to a misa~

ources. - Th~ s, we might affirm the result in

~

------

Wirt z as to hospitals, though I have my doubts about schools.
The "necessity principle" also supports the result we
reached in Fry, for there is respectable economic authority
for the proposition that wage and price controls do not work
unless substantially all wages and prices are frozen.

-

It

would also support the results in prior cases (other than
Wirtz) involving a clash between state activities and federal
commerce power:

i n United States v. California, the state

was operating a railroad in interstate commerce; in Sanitary
District v. United States, Chicago was diverting water from
Lake Michigan in quantities the Army Corps of Engineers said
would lower the water level and impair navigation on all the
Great Lakes.

a\so

This analysis ~leaves untouched the application

of Title VII to state employees, because legislation forbidding
state discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion,
and national origin is easily sustained by reference to
congressional power under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

-

Because of its nature and history, congressional power to
enforce the Civil War amendments should not be constrained

\

.e

-

13 .

by countervailing state interests to the degree I suggest
here, and perhaps not at all.
(2)

A general balancing analysis.

General's suggestion:

This is the Solicitor

to balance the asserted federal interest

against the degree of interference with state interests.

This

analysis is rather similar to the ,rnecessi ty principle," except
that it is much looser.

It does not start with the premise

'

------ are entitled to be free of ~
that the states

r
-

cessary f ~ eral

interference, but'b::-eats the level of permissible interference
~

~

/(

--

as a factual matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
It also goes farther in protecting federal power, because it
would not restrict the federal government to necessary action
when interference with the states is slight.
Application of a balancing analysis in this case is less
certain of result.

If the parties' figures are to be believed,

there is very little difference between the states' employment
practices without the amendments and the requirements imposed
by the amendments.

This minimal impact, combined with the

"rational basis" analysis in Part I of this memo, establishes
that the federal interest is rather small.

I

On the other hand,

the interference with existing state practices is minimal.
~

/'-

The only significant problem is the states' objection to
being regulated by the federal government at all, and this
interest is diff icult to quantify or compare to the federal

-

interests

:dll

rr•

&,\.

~ ~ "-oc loa(M'--~ laffY-~cL..

-

-

-

14.

Either mode of analysis requires disapproval of much
that was said in Maryland v. Wirtz, in addition to scattered
declarations in earlier opinions.

Either will require some

substitution of judicial judgment for that of Congress, though

l

I favor the "necessity gEinciple" on the ground that it would

esta~lish :

rule that is m: re definite and more easily express~d,

it would inform Congress of what is required for direct regulation of state activities, and it would require analysis of only

one set of variables.

I also think it strikes a fair balance

between the two interests, and unless it is applied stingily
it would not rob Congress of the ability to deal flexibly

-

with national problems.

P.C.
ss

-

lfp/ss

-
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Excerpts from Ma. land v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183

"If a State is engaging in economic activities
that are validly regulated by the Federal
Government when engaged in by private persons,
the State too may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation." (197)
"This Court has examined and will continue to
examine federal statutes to determine whether
there is a rational basis for regarding them
as regulations of commerce among the States.
But it will not carve up the commerce power
to protect enterprises indistinguishable in
their effect on commerce from private businesses,
simply because those enterprises happen to be
run by the States for the benefit of their
citizens." (198-199)
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September 27, 1975

National League of Cities
If the Court votes to overrrule Wirtz, I might take
a look at Justice White's Canadian speech, p. 18, for a
decision by Brandeis o~ stare decisis.

L. F. P. , Jr.
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No. 74-878/879 National League of Cities

~

(My Notes for Use at Conference)
The Solicitor General's Position
The SG defends , this legislation by conventional Commerce
Clause analysis.

He establishes easily, relying on the

"flow" of goods in commerce, an effect upon commerce.
He then finds a "rational basis" for this regulation by
relying on the familiar arguments of (i) state labor disputes
affecting commerce, and (ii) the unfairness of state competition
with private business.

-

The SG adds a third justification, arguing that national
"economic health" entitles Congress to regulate labor
conditions of state and local employees.
The SG concedes, as he must, that his argument as to
unfair competition has limited applicability.

It may apply

to hospitals (as in Wirtz), only remotely to schools, and
not at all

.N

to police, fire , garbage collection and the

like.
Constitutional Infirmity in SG's Position
The SG denies that the power of the federal government
under the Commerce Clause is different (i.~., more limited)

-

when applied to the states themselves, than when applied
to private businesses.

He relies heavily on the "private

-

-

-

2.

business" authorities.
Somewhat inconsistently, however, the SG concedes that
federal intrusion, directly upon the states and localities,
under the Commerce Clause, does have a limit.

It does not

justify regulation, the SG says, of "policy making" employees although he declines to define this category.
A more fundamental defect in the SG's position is that
he apparently assumes the Commerce Clause vests a power that
is subject to no other constraints.

Justice Stewart correctly

noted that the commerce power, plenary as it may be, cannot
override other provisions of the Constitution, e.g., First
Amendment rights.

-

In this case, Congress strikes directly at the
constitutional concept of federalism.

There is no express

provision of the Constitution (other than the Tenth Amendment)
that articulates a doctrine of federalism.

But the entire

Constitution is structured in conformity with what we call
federalism, and no one denys that we have a federal system.
The Cons ti tu tion never woulci have been approved under
any other theory.

To be sure, evolving concepts of the

respective roles of the federal and state governments have
diminished the areas in which federalism is determinative.
Yet the government in this case does not contend that we
should bury the doctrine; merely, that we should emasculate
it at its very core.

-

-

-

~ -f ~ 4,oJC
3.

Necessity Principle ~ ~ : ; ; : ; : : ~
4,..,c-t...,. ~ ~ I I ~
,.« ,d.J

GZ_,~~

In my view, this Court is responsible - as one of its
primary duties - for the preservation of the federal system.
This requires us to impose (to use equal protection term~nology)
a stricter degree of scrutiny when federal legislation impinges
directly on th~ seat66 than when it impinges upon private
affairs.

The familiar "rational basis" analysis is appropriate

to the sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to
private individuals and businesses. · But this level of scrutiny
seems inappropriate when the Congress undertakes to intrude
directly into the methods of operation of state and local
governments.

-

The principles of federalism should operate here as
an independent constitutional principle.

I think these can

and must operate to limit exercise of the commerce power to
protect the states in the same way that provisions guaranteeing
liberty protect the individual.
In applying strict scrutiny to this type of legislation,
I would articulate a "necessity principle".

Under this

concept Congress may include states in a general regulatory
program only when this is necessary for the program's
effectiveness.

To put it another way, Congress may regulate

the state's own affairs only when the national interest
requires it.

-

This rule would preserve federal power to take

effective action that is clearly necessary in the overall
national interest.

The rule would recognize, however, that

•

-

-

4.

if federalism retains any meaningful content, states must be
free of unnecessary interference in the forms and methods
by which they carry out governmental functions.
Fry illustrates the principle.

The legislation dealt,

as our opinion made clear, with a "national emergency", and
also one of presumed temporary nature.

Moreover, the method

chosen to meet the emergency - ceilings on wages and prices would have been frustrated by the omission of any major
s egment of the country's work forc e.
The pr inciple may be applied to the present case.
We may assume that the national interest requires the FLSA
program for private enterprise.

-

The program is justified by

the traditional concerns as to unfair competition and preventing
labor disputes.

.a.ZZ.~,,- t~a__

But these concerns apply with a lt@tM! S f orce

to regulating labor conditions of state and local government
employees.

There is no showing in this case that the basic

goals of t h e Act can be a ttained only by including such
employees.
Thus if strict scrutin7 ~

,,

~

sis is applied to ascertain

whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to achieve the
f ederal goal, the extension of the Act to state and local
e mployees cannot be justified.

Few of such employees are in

a-fl,,H-s .,..,...... ,,,,_

c ompetition with private business, and ~
~~ A

states do ~

allow

c ollective bargainingA«- strikes against the government.

-

1'~ ~r Connnerce

Clause cases cannot be reconciled under

a strict scrutiny standard focused on necessity.

I believe,

-

-

•
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however, that most decisions, rather than expansive dicta,
can be reconciled.
No Limit to the Government's Rationale
If this legislation is sustained, it is difficult to
perceive any limit on the power of Congress to intrude directly
upon the way state and local governments operate.

The SG

could suggest no limit, beyond his unfocused distinction
between supervisory and nonsupervisory employees.
As the Governor of Utah suggested, the way would be
cleared for the following types of action ,¼ch are illustrative
A

and not exhaustive:

-

Federal mandating of the right of state and local
employees, including fire and police, to strike.
Extension of NLRA to all such employees, compelling
collective bargaining.
Federally imposed uniformity in fringe benefits,
including retirement, health and accident benefits.
Compelling compliance, by state and local agencies
and operations, with The Occupational Safety and Health
Act.

(~/k.A'o/ a.~,r,,-'l-t ~ )
Imposing upon states and localities the federal Civil

Service System, with "cradle to grave" type regulation of
employment, promotion, salaries -and benefits. ·k

-

*Fair employment legislation(~·&·, Title VII) may be
sustained under this analysis by virtue of congressional
power under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

-

-

-
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All of these may be desirable types of regulation. But
this is not the issue.
federalism:

They relate to the essence of

the right of the states to make those decisions

v?4eb,I~

for themselves and the CQEPelatioe right to control their own
personnel policies.
One can argue that the states can "trust" Congress not to
go so far.

But the duty of this Court is to apply constitutional

principle rather than trust to legislative forbearance.
extension of FLSA to the states in 1974 is an example.

The
Judging

by the briefs in this case, virtually every state and city in
the nation opposes this legislation.

The National Governors

Conference and the National League of Cities are parties.

-

Two

members of the Cabinet testified against the 1974 Amendment
and the President vetoed it.

Yet, the political muscle of

organized labor outweighed what appeared to be overwhelming
local political views to the contrary.
Distinguish or Overrule Wirtz
The holding in Wirtz can be distinguished.

It is clear

that Justice Harlan focused primarily on perceived competition
with private activity:

-

"If a state is engaged in economic activities
that are validly regulated by the federal
government when engaged in by private persons,
the state too may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation. This was
settled by the unanimous decision in United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175." Wirtz,
392 U.S., at 197.

.)

.

-

-

-

7.

But one must acknowledge that the sweep of language in Wirtz
is broad enough to encompass more than "state enterprises"
that may be "engaged in by private persons".
If necessary, I would vote to overrule Wirtz .

Mr . Justice

Brandeis., discussing stare decisis, has said:

I

" . • . in cases involving the federal Constitution,
where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often
overruled its earlier decisions." Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S., at 405-508
(dissent)

~

It is clear, at least in areas involving e:reB:s of

"

employment, that the Congress never withdraws benefits once

conferred or surrenders power once confirmed.

-

There will be

no restraint against continued extension of this federal
power at the expense of states and localities unless checked
by this Court.

It is not too much to say>-- tha t a f undamental

principle of our form of government is at stake in this case .

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

-

'

I
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No. 74-878/879 National League of Cities
(My Notes for Use at Conference)
The Solicitor General's Position
The SG ·defends.. this legislation by conventional Cormnerce
Clause analysis.

He establishes easily, relying on the

"flow" of goods in couunerce, an effect upon couunerce.
He then finds a "rational basis" for this regulation by
reiying on the familiar arguments of (i) state labor disputes
affecting commerce, and (ii) the unfairness of state competition
with private business.
The SG adds a third justificatio~, arguing that national
"economic health" entitles Congress to regulate labor
conditions of state and local employees.
The SG concedes, aas he must, that his argument as to
unfair competition has limited applicability.

It may. apply

to hospitals (as in Wirtz), only remotely to schools, and
not at _all as to police, fire, garbage col,lection and the
like.
Constitutional Infirmity in SG's Position
The SG denies that the oower of the federal govemment
.

.

under th~ Commerce Clause is different

<.!-.•!.·,

more limited)

I

when applied to the states themselves, than· when applied
C

to -private businesses.

He relies heavily on the "private

-

•

2.

business" authorities.
Somewhat inconsistently, however, the SG concedes that
federal intrusion, directly upon the states and localities,
under the Commerce Clause, does have a limit. It does not
.
just_ify regulation; the: SG says, of "policy making" employees ;,

,..:

'

~

·,

~

(·

~-

'

although he declines to define this category.
~·'
' :'· -~
..
A more . fundamental defect in the SG's position is that
...,

he apparently -assumes
the Commerce Clause vests a power that
~"'
(',

ta subject to no other constraints.

Justice Stewart. correctly

noted that the commerce power; plenary as it may be, cannot
override other provisions of the Constitution,~-&•, First
Amendment rights •
In this case, Congress strikes directly at the
constitutional concept of federalism.

There is no express

provision of the Constitution (other than the Tenth Amendment)
that articulates a doctrine of federalism.

But the entire

Constitution is structured in conformity with what we· call
federalism, and no one denys that

we

have a federal system.

The Constitution never would have been approved under
any other theory.

To be .sure, evolving concepts of the

respective roles of the federal and state governments have,
diminished the areas in which federalism is determinative.
Yet the government in this case does not contend that we
should bury the doctrine; merely, that we should emasculate
it at its very core.

-

-

3.

The Necessity Principle

In

my

view, this Court is responsible - as one of it1

primary duties - for the preservation of the federal system.
This requires us to impose (to use equal protection terminology)
a atricter ·degree
of r,•~rutiny
when federal legislation impinges
•.
. '
directly on t~e states than when it impinges upon private
affairs.

1

The 'familiar "rational basis" analysis is appropriate

to the _se.~ tions ,of .~he Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to
private individuals and businesses.

But this level of scrutiny

seems inappropriate when the Congress undertakes to intrude

directly into the methods of operation of state and local
governments.
The principles of federalism should operate here as

an independent con1titutional principle.

I think these can

and must operate to limit exercise of the commerce power to
protect the states in the same way that provisions guaranteeing
liberty protect the individual.
In applying strict scrutiny to this type of legislation,
I would articulate a "necessity principle".

Under this

concept Congress may include states ;n a general regulatory
program only when this is necessary for the program's
effectiveness.

To put it another way, Congress may regulate

the state's own affairs only when the national interest
requires it.

This rule would preserve federal power to take

effective action that .is clearly necessary in the overall
national interest.

The rule would recognize, however, that

-

-

4.

if federalism retains any meaningful content, s~ates must be
free of unnecessary interference in the forms and methods
by which they carry out governmental functions.
~

'illustrates the principle.

The legislation dealt,

as our opinion _made clear, with a "national emergency", and
also one of presumed temporary nature.

Moreover, the method

chosen to meet the emergency - ceilings on wages .and prices would have been frustrated by the omission of any major
segment of the country's work force.
The prlinciple may be applied to the present case.
We may assume that the national interest requires the FLSA
program for private enterprise.

The program is justified by

the traditional concerns as to unfair competition and preventing
labor dispute~. , ,But" these concerns apply with al~ernate force
.-

'

to regulating labor conditions of state and local government
employee_s.

;

"

t

Thei:e is no showing in this case that the basic

goals . of the.· ~.c t can .- ~e attained only by including such
employees.

,-

Thus if strict scrutiny analysis is applied to ascertain
whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to achieve the
federal goal, the extension of the Act to state and local
employees cannot be justified.

Few of such employees are in
'

competition with private business, and most states- do not allow
collective bargaining or strikes against the government.
All pt'io1' Commerce Clause ~~ses cannot be reconciled under
a strict scrutiny standard focused on, necessity.

I believe,

-

-

s.

however, that most decisions, rather than expansive dicta,
can be reconciled.
No Limit to the Government's Rationale
If this legislation is sustained, it is difficult to
perceive any limit on -the power of Congress to intrude directly
upon the way state and local governments operate.
1

The SG

I

i

could suggest no limit, beyond his unfocused distinction
between supervisory and nonsupervisory employees.
I

As the Govemor of Utah suggested, the way would be
cleared for the following types of action wich are illustrative
and not exhaustive:
Federal mandating of the right of state and local
employees, including fire and police, to strike.
Extension of NLRA to all such empioyees, compelling
collective bargaining.
Federally imposed uniformity in fringe benefits,
including retirement, health and accident benefits.
Compelling compliance, by state and local agencies
and operations, with The Occupational Safety and Health
Act.

Imposing upon states and localities the federal Civil
Service System, with ''cradle to grave" type regulation of
employment, promotion, salaries:.. and benefits.*

¼Fair employment legislation {e.&., Title VII) may be

sustained under this analysis li'y virtue of congressional
power under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

-

-

6.

All of these may be desirable types of regulation. But
this is not the issue.
federalism:

They relate to the essence of

the right of the states to make those decisions

for ,themselves and the correlative right to control their own
personnel policies.
One ca~ argue that the states can "trust" Congress not to
go so far.

But the duty of this Court is to apply constitutional

principle rather than trust to legislative forbearance.
extension o; FLSA to t~e states in 1974 is an example.
,,_

t l

-

• •

,:,

The
Judging

..::.

by the briefs
in..' this 'case, virtually every state and city in
. .,

-

-

'\

•

'

l

the 'nation ~-opposes
this - legislation.
"

.

'

The National Govemors

Conference and the National League of Cities are· parties.
f,

'r.
•

'J.

I

-

t,.

I

Two

• •

:'

members of 'the,:_ eabinet testified against the 1974 Amendment

and the President vetoed it.

Yet, the political muscle of

organized labor outweighed what appeared to be overwhelming
local political views to ~he contrary.
Distinguish or overrule Wirtz

.The holding in Wirtz can be distinguished.

It is clear

that Justice Harlan focused primarily on perceived competition

withpprivate activity:

"If a state is engaged in economic activities

that are validly regulated by the federal
government when engaged in by private persons,
the state too may be forced to con£orm its
activities to federal regulation. This was
settled by the unanimous decision in United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175." Wirtz,
392 U.S., at 197.

-

-

7.

But one must acknowledge that the sweep of language in Wirtz
is broad enough to encompass more than "state enterprises"
that may ,be "engaged in by private persons".
If necessary, I would vote to overrule Wirtz.

Mr. Justice

Brandeis, discussing stare decisis, has said:

" ••• in cases involving the federal Constitution,
where correction through ' legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often
overruled its earlier decisions." Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 28S U.S., at 405-S08
(dissent)
It i ,s clear, at least in areas involving areas of
employment, that the Congress never withdraws benefits once
conferred or surrenders power once confirmed.

There will be

no restraint against continued extension of this federal
power at the expense of states and localities unless checked
by this Court.

It ia not too much to say, that a fundamental

principle of our form of government is at stake in this case.

L.F.P., Jr.
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In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the
. above.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl
Nos. 74-878

(~

~)

AND

74-879

The National League of Cities
et al., Appellants,
v.
74-878
W. J. Usery, Jr., Secretary of On Appeals from the
Labor.
United States District
Court for the District
State of California,
of Columbia.
Appellant,
74-879
v.
W. J . Usery, Jr., Secretary of
Labor,
[May -, 1976]

MR. JUSTICE

REHNQUIST

delivered the opinion for the

Court,
Nearly 40 years ago Congress enacted the Fair Labor
Standards Act,1 and required employers covered by the
Act to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage 2
and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular
rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 during a
work week. 3 By this act covered employers were required to keep certain records to aid in the enforcement
of the Act,4 and to comply with specified child labor
standards.5 This Court unanimously upheld the Act as
1 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C.
·§ 201 et seq. (194-0 ed.) .
2 29 U. S. C. § 206 (a) (194-0 ed.) .
8 29 U. S. C. § 207 (a) (3) (1940 ed.).
4 29 U. S. C. §211 (c) (194-0 ed.).
5 29 U. S. C. § 212 (194-0 ed.).

~
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-
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a valid exercise of congressional authority under the commerce power in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100
( 1941), observing :
"Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of
commerce which do not infringe some constitutional
prohibition are within the plenary power conferred
on Congress by the Commerce Clause." Id., at 115.
The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938
specifically excluded the States and their political subdivisions from its coverage. 6 In 1974, however, Congress
enacted the most recent of a series of broadening amendments to the Act. By these amendments Congress has
extended the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all public employees employed by the
States and by their various political subdivisions. Appellants in these cases include individual cities and States,
the National League of Cities, and the National Governors' Conference; 7 they brought an action in the District
29 U , S. C. § 203 (d) (1940 ed.) :
" 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indjrectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not
include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a
St<tte .... "
7 Appellants in No. 74--878 are the National League of Cities, the
National Governors' Conference, the St<ttes of Arizona, Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., and the
cities of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Lompoc, Cal., and Salt Lake City,
Utah. The Appellant in No. 74--879 is the St<tte of California.
In view of the fact that the appellants include sovereign States
and their political subdivisions to whom application of the 1974
amendments is claimed to be unconstitutional, we need not consider
whether the organizational appellants had standing to challenge the
Act, See Californi,a Bankers Assn. v. ShuJ,tz, 416 U . S. 21, 44-45
(1974 ).
6

-
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Court for the District of Columbia which challenged the
validity of the 1974 amendments. They asserted in
effect that when Congress sought to apply the Fair Labor
Standards Act provisions virtually across the board to
employees of state and municipal governments it "infringed a constitutional prohibition" running in favor of
the States as States. The gist of their complaint was
not that the conditions of employment of such public
employees were beyond the scope of the commerce power
had those employees been employed in the private sector,
but that the established constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity consistently recognized in a long
series of our cases affirmatively prevented the exercise of
this authority in the manner which Congress chose in
the 1974 Amendments.

I
In a series of amendments beginning in 1961 Congress
began to extend the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to some types of public employees. The
1961 amendment to the Act 8 extended its coverage to
persons who were employed in "enterprises" engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 9
And in 1966, with the amendment of the definition of
employers under the Act,10 the exemption heretofore extended to the States and their political subdivisions was
removed with respect to employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools. We nevertheless sustained the
validity of the combined effect of these two amendments
in Mary land v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968) .
In 1974, Congress again br~adened the coverage of the
Act. The definition of "employer" in the Act now specifically "includes a public agency," 29 U. S. C. § 203 (d) .
Pub. L. 87- 30, 75 Stat. 65.
29 U. S. C. §§ 203 (r ), 203 (s) , 206 (b), 207 (a)(2) (1964 ed.).
1 0 80 Stat. 831, 29 U. S. C, § 203 (d) (1964 ed., Supp . II ).
8
9

-
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ln addition, the critical definition of "enterprises engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce"
was expanded to encompass "an activity of a public
ngency," and goes on to specify that
"The employees of an enterprise which is a public
agency shall for purposes of this subsection be
deemed to be employees engaged in commerce, or in
the production of goods for commerce, or employees
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or
materials that have been moved in or produced for
commerce." 29 U. S. C. § 203 (s) (5) .
Under the Amendments "public agency" is in turn defined as including
"the Government of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any
agency of the United States (including the United
States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission),
a State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any
interstate governmental agency."
29 U. S. C.
203 (x) .
By its 1974 amendments, then, Congress has now entirely
removed the exemption previously afforded States and
their political subdivisions, substituting only the Act's
general exemption for executive, administrative, or professional personnel, 29 U. S. C. § 213 (a) (1) , which is
supplemented by provisions excluding from the Act's
coverage those individuals holding public elective office·
or serving such an officeholder in one of several specific
capacities. 29 U. S. C. § 203 (e) (2) (C). The Act thus:
imposes upon almost all public employment the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements previously
restricted to employees engaged in interstate commerce.
These requirements are essentially identical to those im-

-
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posed upon private employers, although the Act does
attempt to make some provision for public employment
relationships which are without counterpart in the
private sector, such as those presented by fire protection
and law enforcement personnel. See 29 U. S. C. § 207
(k) .

Challenging these 1974 amendments in the District
Court, appellants sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the amendments' application to them,
and a three-judge court was accordingly convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282. That court, after hearing a.r gument on the law from the parties, granted appellee Secretary of Labor's motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted. The District Court stated it was "troubled" by
appellants' contentions that the amendments would intrude upon the States' performance of essential governmental functions. The court went on to say that it
considered their contentions :
"substantial and that it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it appropriate to draw back
from the far-reaching implications of [Maryland v.
Wirtz, supra]; but that is a decision that only the
upreme Court can make, and as a Federal district
court we feel obliged to apply the Wirtz opinion as
it stands."
We noted probable jurisdiction in order to consider the
important questions recognized by the District Court. 420
U. S. 906 (1975 ).11 We agree with the District Court
that the appellants' contentions are substantial. Indeed
upon full consideration of the question we have decided
that the "far-reaching implications" of Wirtz, should be
11 When t he cases were not decided in October Term, 1974, they
werl} set down for reargument, 421 U. S. 936 (1975) .

-
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overruled, and that the judgment of the District Court
must be reversed.

II
It is established beyond peradventure that the Commerce Clause of Art. I of the Constitution is a grant of
plenary authority to Congress. That authority is, in the
words of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. (21 U, S.) 1 (1824), " ... the power to regulate; that is to prescribe the rule by which commerce
is to be governed." Id., at 196.
When considering the validity of asserted applications
of this power to wholly private activity, the Court has
made it clear that
" [ e] ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the
activity, combined with like conduct by others
similarly situated, affects commerce among the
States or with foreign nations." Fry v. United
States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975) .
Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even
when its exercise may pre-empt express state law determinations contrary to the result which has commended
itself to collective wisdom of Congress, has been held to
be limited only by the requirement that "the means.
chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the
end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 , 262 (1964).
Appellants in no way challenge these decisions establishing the breadth of authority granted Congress under·
the commerce power. Their contention, on the contrary,.
is that when Congress seeks to regulate directly the aetivities of States as public employers, it transgresses an
affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power akin to
other commerce power affirmative limitations contained
in. the Constitution. Congressional enactments which_

-
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may be fully within the grant of legislative authority
contained in the Commerce Clause may nonetheless be
invalid because found to offend against the right to trial
by jury contained in the Sixth Amendment, United States
v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 ( 1968), or the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Leary v. United States,
395 U. S. 6 (1969). Appellants' essential contention is
that the 1974 amendments to the Act, while undoubtedly
within the scope of the Commerce Clause, encounter a
similar constitutional barrier because they are to be applied directly to the States and subdivisions of States as
employers.
This Court has never doubted that there are limits
upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty,
even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax
or to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I
of the Constitution. In Wirtz, for example, the Court
took care to assure the appellants that it had "ample
power to prevent . . . 'the utter destruction of the
State as a sovereign political entity,' " which they
feared. 392 U. S., at 196. Appellee Secretary in this
case, both in his brief and upon oral argument, has
agreed that our federal system of government imposes
definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate
the activities of the States as States by means of the
commerce power. See, e. g., Appellee's Brief, at 30-41;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-43. In Fry, supra, the Court recognized that an express declaration of this limitation is
found in the Tenth Amendment :
"While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism,' stating merely that 'all is retained
which has not been surrendered,' United States v.
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without
significance. The Amendment expressly declares
the constitutional policy that Congress may not

-
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exercise power in a fashion that impairs the Statest
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system.. . ." 421 U. S., at 547.
In New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 526 (1946),
Chief Justice Stone, speaking for four Members of an
eight-Member Court in rejecting the proposition that
Congress could impose taxes on the States so long as it
did so in a nondiscriminatory manner, observed :
"A State may, like a private individual, own real
property and receive income. But in view of out
former decisions we could hardly say that a general
nondiscriminatory real estate tax (apportioned), or
an income tax laid upon citizens and States alike
could be constitutionally applied to the State's
capitol, its State-house, its public school houses,
public parks, or its revenues from taxes or school
lands, even though all real property and all income
of the citizen is taxed." 326 U. S., at 587-582.
The expressions in these more recent cases trace back
to earlier decisions of this Court recognizing the essential
role of the States in our federal system of government,
Chief Justice Chase, perhaps because of the particular
·time at which he occupied that office, had occasion more
than once to speak for the Court on this point. In
Texas v. White , 7 Wall. 700, 725 ( 1869), he declared that
"[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.n
In Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 73 (1869), his opinion
for the Court said :
"Both the States and the United States existed
before the Constitution. The people, through that
instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample
power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the

-
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Confederate government which acted with powers,
greatly restricted, only upon the States. But in
many Articles of the Constitution the necessary
existence of the States, and, within their proper
spheres, the independent authority of the States, is
distinctly recognized." Id., at 76.

In Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926),
the Court likewise observed that "neither government.
may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its powers." Id., at 523.
Appellee Secretary argues that the cases in which this
Court has upheld sweeping exercises of authority by Congress, even though those exercises pre-empted state regulation of the private sector, have already curtailed the
sovereignty of the States quite as much as the 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. We do
not agree. It is one thing to recognize the authority of
Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses
necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside~.
It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of con-.
gressional authority directed not to private citizens, but
to the States as States. We have repeatedly recognized
that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every
state government which may not be impaired by Congress,
not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that manner. In Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559
(1911 ), the Court gave this example of such an attribute :
"The power to locate its own seat of government
and to determine when and how it shall be changed
from one place to another, and to appropriate its
own public funds for that purpose, are essentially

-
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and peculiarly state powers. · That one of the original thirteen States could now be shorn of such
powers by an Act of Congress would not be for a
moment entertained." 221 U. S., at 565.
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the
States' power to determine the wages which shall be paid
to those whom they employ in order to carry out their
governmental functions, what hours those persons will
work, and what compensation will be provided where;
these employees may be caped upon to work overtime.
The question we must resolve in this case, then, is.
whether these determinations are "functions essential to
separate and independent existence," Coyle v. Smith, supra, at 580, quoting from Lane County v. Oregon, supra,
at 76, so that Congress may not abrogate the States'
otherwise plenary authority to make them.
In their complaint appellants advanced estimates of
substantial costs which will be imposed upon them by
the 1974 amendments. Since the District Court dismissed their complaint, we take its well-pleaded allegations as true, although it appears from appellee's submissions in the District Court and in this Court that
resolution of the factual disputes as to the effect of the·
amendments is not critical to our disposition of the case.
Judged solely in terms of increased costs in dollars,
these allegations show a significant impact on the functioning of the governmental bodies involved. The
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tenn., for example, asserted that the Act wilI
increase its costs of providing essential police and fire
protection, without any increase in service or in current
salary levels, by $938,000 per year. Cape Girardeau,
Mo., estimated that its annual budget for fire protection
may have to be increased by anywhere from $250,000 to
$:400,Q0Q aver the cur.rent figure of $350,00Q. The State
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6f Arizona alleged that the annual additional expenditures which will be required if it is to continue to provide
essential state services may total $2½ million dollars.
The State of California, which must devote significant
portions of its budget to fire suppression endeavors, estimated that application of the Act to its employment
practices will necessitate an increase in its budget of between $8 million and $16 million.
Increased costs are not, of course, the only advers~
effects which compliance with the Act will visit upon
state and local governments, and in turn upon the citizens who depend upon those governments. In its complaint in intervention, for example, California asserted
that it could not comply with the overtime costs ( approximately $750,000 per year) which the Act required to
be paid to California Highway Patrol cadets during their
academy training program. California reported that it
had thus been forced to reduce its ac.ademy training pro-•
gram from 2,080 hours to only 960 hours, a compromise
undoubtedly of substantial importance to those whose
safety and welfare may depend upon the preparedness
of the California Highway Patrol.
This type of forced relinquishment of important governmental activities is further reflected in the complaint's:
allegation that the City of Inglewood, California, has
been forced to curtail its affirmative action program for
providing employment opportunities for men and women
interested in a career in law enforcement. The Inglewood police department has abolished a program for'
police trainees who split their week between on the job
training and the classroom. The city could not abrogate·
its contractual obligations to these trainees, and it con-,
eluded that compliance with the Act ih these circumstances was too financially burdensome to permit continuance of the clas!:!room program. The city of Clovis,.
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Cal., has been put to a similar choice regarding an intern..
ship program it was running in cooperation with a California State University. According to the complaint,
because the interns' compensation brings them within
the purview of the Act the city must decide whether to
eliminate the program entirely or to substantially reduce
its beneficial aspects by doing away with any pay for the
interns.
Quite apart from the substantial costs imposed upon
the States and their political subdivisions, the Act displaces state policies regarding the manner in which they
will structure delivery of those governmental services
which their citizens require. The Act, speaking directly
to the States qua States, requires that they shall pay
all but an extremely limited minority of their employees
the minimum wage rates currently chosen by Congress.
It may well be that as a matter of economic policy it
would be desirable that States, just as private employers,
comply with these minimum wage requirements. But it
cannot be gainsaid that the federal requirement directly
supplants the considered policy choices of the States'
elected officials and administrators as to how they wish to
structure pay scales in state employment. The State
might wish to employ persons with little or no training,
or those who wish to work on a casual basis, or those who
for some other reason do not possess minimum employment requirements, and pay them less than the federally
prescribed minimum wage. It may wish to offer part
time or summer employment to teenagers at a figure less
than the minimum wage, and if unable to do so may
decline to offer such employment at all. But the Act
would forbid such choices by the States. The only "discretion" left to them under the Act is either to attempt to
increase their revenue to meet the additional financial
burden imposed upon them by paying congressionally
prescribed wages to their existing complement of em-
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ployees, or to reduce that complement to a number which
c~n be paid the federal minimum wage without increasing revenue.12
This dilemma presented by the minimum wage restrictions may seem not immediately different from that
faced by private employers, who have long been covered by the Act and who must find ways to increase
their gross income if they are to pay higher wages while
maintaining current earnings. The difference, however,
is that a State is not merely a factor in the "shifting
economic arrangements" of the private sector of the
economy, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 95 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J ., concurring) , but is itself a coordinate
element in the system established by the framers for
governing our federal union.
The degree to which the FLSA amendments would
interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty can
be seen even more clearly upon examining the overtime
requirements of the Act. The general effect of these
provisions is to require the States to pay their employees
at premium rates whenever their work exceeds a specified
number of hours in a given period. The asserted reason
for these provisions is to provide a financial disincentive
upon using employees beyond the work period deemed
appropriate by Congress. According to appellee,
" [t] his premium rate can be avoided if the [State]
uses other employees to do the overtime work. This,
in effect, tends to discourage overtime work and to
spread employment, which is the result Congress
intended." Appellee's Brief, at 43.
12 The complaint recited that a number of appellants were prohibited by their state constitutions from incurring debts in excess
·of taxes for the current year. Those constitutions also impose
·ceilings upon the percentage rates at which property might be
taxed by those governmental units. App. 36-37.
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We do not doubt that this may be a salutary result, and
that it has a sufficiently rational relationship to commerce to validate the .application of the overtime provisions to private employers. But, like the minimum
wage provisions, the vice o~ the Act as sought to be applied here is that it directly penalizes the States for
choosing to hire governmental employees on terms different from those which Congress has sought to impose.
This congressionaily imposed displacement of state
decisions may substantially restructure traditional ways
in which the local governments have arranged their affairs. Although at this point many of the actual effects
under the proposed Amendments remain a matter of
·some dispute among the parties, enough can be satisfactorily anticipated for an outline discussion of their
general import. The requirement imposing premium
rates upon any employment in excess of what Congress has decided is appropriate for a governmental
employee's workweek, for example, appears likely to have
the effect of coercing the States to structure work periods
in some employment areas, such as police and fire protection, in a manner substantially different from practices which have long been commonly accepted among
local governments of this Nation. In addition, appellee
represents that the Act will require that the pl'.emium
compensation for overtime worked must be paid in cash,
rather than with compensatory time off, unless such compensatory time is taken in the same pay period. Appellee's Supp. Brief, at 9-10; see Dunlop v. New Jersey,
522 F . 2d 504 (CA3 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-532.
· This too appears likely to be highly disruptive of accepted employment practices in many governmental
areas where the demand for a number of employees to
perform important jobs for extended periods on short
notice can be both unpredictable and critical. Another
· example of congressional choices displacing those of the

•
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States in the area of wha.t are without doubt essential
governmental decisions may be found in the practice of
using volunteer firemen, a source of manpower crucial
to many of our smaller towns' existence. Under the regulations proposed by appellee, whether individuals are
indeed "volunteers" rather than "employees" subject to ·
the minimum wage provisions of the Act are questions to
be decided in the courts. See Appellee's Brief, at 49 and
n. 41. It goes without saying that provisions such as
these contemplate a significant reduction of traditional
volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn
on to complement the operation of many local governmental functions.
Our examination of the effect of the 1974 amendments,
as sought to be extended to the States and their political
subdivisions, satisfies us that both the minimum wage
and the maximum hour provisions will impermissibly
interfere with the integral governmental functions of
these bodies. We earlier noted some disagreement between the parties regarding the precise effect the amendments will have in application. We do not believe particularized assessments of actual impact are crucial to
resolution of the isue presented, however. For even if
we accept appellee's assessments concerning the impact
of the amendments, their application will nonetheless
significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as
fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation. These activities are
typical of those performed by state and local governmen ts in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services.13
13 These examples are obviously not an exhaustive catalogue of
the numerous line and support activities which are well within the
area of traditional operations of state and local governments.
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Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments
are created to provide, services such as these which the
States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to
make those fundamental employment decisions upon
which their systems for performance of these functions
must rest, we think there would be little left of the
States' "separate and independent existence." Coyle,
supra. Thus, even if appellants may have overestimated
the effect which the Act will have upon their current
levels and patterns of governmental activity, the dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to exercise its
Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages
and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their
capacities as sovereign governments. In so doing, Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that
would impair the States' "ability to function effectively
within a federal system," Fry, supra, at 547. This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with
the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution. We hold that insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the /
authority granted Congress by Art. I , § 8, cl. 3.14

III
One final matter requires our attention. Appellee has
vigorously urged that we cannot, consistently with the
Court's decisions in Wirtz, supra, and Fry, supra, rule
14 We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to
. e
· governmental operations by ~rcising authority granted it under other
sections of the Constitutio such as the Spending Power, Art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, or § 5 of t he Fourteent Amendment.

~~
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against him here. It is important to examine this contention so that it will be clear what we hold today, and
what we do not.
With regard to Fry, we disagree with appellee. There
the Court held that the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970 was constitutional as applied to temporarily freeze
the wages of state and local government employees. The
Court expressly noted that the degree of intrusion upon
the protected area of state sovereignty was in that case
even less than that worked by the amendments to the
FLSA which were before the Court in Wirtz. The Court
recognized that the Economic Stabilization Act was "an
emergency measure to counter severe inflation that
threatened the national economy." 421 U. S., at 548.
We think our holding today quite consistent with Fry.
The enactment at issue there was occasioned by an extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being
of all the component parts of our federal system and
which only collective action by the National Government
might forestall. The means selected were carefully
drafted so as not to interfere with the States' freedom
beyond a very limited, specific period of time. The
effect of the across-the-board freeze authorized by that
Act, moreover, displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured nor did it
force the States to remake such choices themselves. Instead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment relationships which the States themselves had
chosen be maintained during the period of the emergency. Finally, the Economic Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pressures upon state budgets rather
than increase them. These factors distinguish the
statute in Fry from the provisions at issue here_
The limits imposed upon the commerce power when
Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflex-
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ible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to
combat a national emergency. "[A]lthough an emergency may not call into life a power which has never
lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." Wilson
v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917) .
With respect to the Court's decision in Wirtz, we reach
a different conclusion. _ Both appellee and the District
Court thought that decision required rejection of appellants' claims. Appellants, in turn, advance several arguments by which they seek to distinguish the facts before
the Court in Wirtz from those presented by the 1974
amendments to the Act. There are undoubtedly factual
distinctions between the two situations, but in view of
the conclusions expressed earlier in this opinion we do
not believe the reasoning in Wirtz may any longer be
regarded as authoritative.
Wirtz relied heavily on the Court's decision in United
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 ( 1936). The opinion
quotes the following language from that case :
" '[We] look to the activities to which the states
have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary
of the restriction upon the federal taxing power.
But there is no such limitation upon the plenary
power to regulate commerce. The State can no.
more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.' 297 U. S.,
at 185:" 392 U. S., at 198.
But we have reaffirmed today that the States as States
stand on a quite different footing than an individual or
a corporation when cha.llenging the exercise of Congress'
power to regulate commerce. We think the dicta 1 5 from
1 5 The holding of United States v. CaJ,if ornia, 297 U. S. 175 (1936),
as opposed to t he language quoted in t he text , is quite consistent
'Yith, our holding today. There California's activity to which t he-
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United States v. California, simply wrong. Congress
may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon
the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are
to be made. We agree that such assertions of power, if
unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in Wirtz, allow "the National Government [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty.'"
392 U. S., at 205, and would therefore transgress the
bounds of the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause. While there are obvious differences
between the schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and
the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion of those governmental services
which the States and their political subdivisions have
traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore
persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceeding_s consistent with this: opinion.
So ordered..

congressional command was directed was not in an area that the
States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities. It was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged
in "common carriage by rail in interstate commerce . . . ." 297
U. S., at 182.
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